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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G, 
BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP, 
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and 
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant/Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Marvel L. Malnar (hereinafter "defendant") replies to 
Respondent's Brief and Cross-appeal as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO QUIET TITLE TO 
THE SIX ACRES IN THIS ACTION, NOR WAS OWNERSHIP OF THE SIX ACRES 
SUBJECT TO A QUIET TITLE ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION, 
AND THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO QUIET TITLE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WAS 
ERROR. 
At page 35 of their Brief respondents complain that 
defendant never initiated any quiet title action regarding the 
property. The present action by plaintiffs seeks reimbursement 
for an unconscionable forfeiture. The burden was upon plaintiffs 
to show that they had returned all properties to the defendant, 
not the reverse. Defendant may indeed be required to bring a 
quiet title action in the future against parties asserting an 
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interest in the six-acre tract, and she may or may not prevail, 
and that may in large measure turn on the issue of notice. The 
parties presently asserting an interest in the six acres were not 
before the court at the time of trial, and defendant had no 
obligation to bring them before the court in order to defend 
against the claims of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not seek to 
quiet the title to the six acres in themselves. That is nowhere 
referred to in their pleadings. Plaintiffs1 pleadings are based 
upon the assertion that the entire property had been returned to 
the defendant. Paragraph 18 of plaintiffs' Complaint states: 
"Termination of the contract between plaintiffs and 
defendant and repossession of the entire property by 
defendant including the six acres previously released 
has resulted in defendant receiving damages so 
disproportionate to any loss actually sustained by 
defendant or which could have been reasonably 
contemplated by the parties as to be exorbitant, to 
shock the conscience and to unjustly enrich the 
defendant." (Emphasis added.) 
Such is not the fact, and defendant so answered and proved. And 
that in itself should have been conclusive against any judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs in this proceeding. 
The finding of the court that defendant owns no interest 
in the six acres, and the court's incorporation of that finding as 
paragraph 3 of the Judgment and Decree are not only contrary to 
the weight of the evidence, but are error as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs never had nor claimed any interest in the six acres. 
This lawsuit was commenced in July 1985 by plaintiffs' 
predecessors, and plaintiffs purchased the lawsuit by Assignment 
of Claims and Cause of Action (Exhibit 19) on January 30, 1987. 
Plaintiffs did not purchase any interest in the six acres by the 
terms of that instrument or otherwise. In fact, Ferron Elder, one 
of the plaintiffs' predecessors, purportedly conveyed the-property 
five months earlier to Darrell Didericksen by Warranty Deed dated 
February 5, 1985, and recorded April 22, 1985 (Ex. 23). There is 
no way the court could adjudicate the title to the six acres in 
plaintiffs, and the court's finding and adjudiction that defendant 
has no interest in the property is improper and meaningless. Had 
plaintiff been claiming ownership of the six acres, the court, 
upon proper pleadings and evidence, could have adjudicated the 
ownership of the property between plaintiffs and defendant, 
although the judgment would not be binding upon persons not 
parties to this action. But it is a meaningless exercise for the 
court to purport to determine the ownership of the six acres 
against the defendant when the plaintiffs weren't claiming 
ownership thereof—and could not. For the court to gratuitously 
rule that defendant doesn't own the property was beyond what the 
court was asked or required to do. The court could certainly go 
no further than to rule that defendant did not get the six acres 
back, and has never been made whole, and has been damaged thereby. 
To attempt to go beyond that in its ruling is a nullity. 
One must ask the question, how does the ruling that 
defendant does not own the property help plaintiffs when they do 
not claim the property? Even if this were construed as a quiet-
title action between plaintiffs and defendant, plaintiffs cannot 
rely on the weakness, if any, of defendant's title. It is 
axiomatic in Utah that in an action to quiet title plaintiffs must 
succeed by virtue of strength of their own title, rather than on 
the weakness, if any, of their opponent's title. See Babcock v. 
Danqerfield, 98 Ut 10, 94 P2d 862 (1939); Mercur Coalition Mines 
Co. v. Cannon, 112 Ut 13, 184 P2d 341 (1947). 
Where plaintiffs are not even claiming ownership, and 
cannot so claim, the court cannot go afield and attempt to quiet 
title to the property against the defendant. Who is the court 
quieting the title in favor of? It makes no sense to quiet title 
against someone if you don't quiet title in favor of someone. If 
a finding that plaintiffs owned the property, or did not own the 
property, were necessary to a determination of plaintiffs' cause, 
then it might be a proper subject of a ruling in this action. The 
court did not have to make that determination. All the court had 
to determine was whether or not defendant got the property back. 
If defendant did not get the property back, then the court should 
have ruled that plaintiffs could not succeed in their action as 
return of all of the property is necessary to a claim for 
unconscionable forfeiture. Even if defendant is in error in that, 
however, the most the court was required to determine under any 
theory was the value of the property not returned, not its 
ownership. 
The Real Estate Contract of December 19, 1980, (Ex. 5) 
clearly refers to a sale of 76 acres and provides for a means of 
payment for the full 76 acres. It is clear under Perkins v. 
Spencer, 121 Ut 468, 243 P2d 446 (1952), that the six acres has 
not been returned—either because it is hopelessly encumbered or 
because the plaintiffs have somehow obtained a deed to it and sold 
it (whether through error or otherwise). Without the return of 
the whole 76 acres, there is no basis for an action for 
reimbursement in any event. Defendant does not get her land back, 
and for the trial court to rule in effect that defendant is not 
entitled to return of the six acres (before any reimbursement for 
an unconscionable forfeiture) is error, as the essence of such an 
action is that the seller got both the land and the money. 
Without a return of the six acres, defendant did not get the land 
and the money, and unless the land is returned, there is no basis 
for any claim by plaintiffs. As land is considered "unique" in 
the law, it seems clear that the exact land that is sold must be 
returned, not other land and not a credit of some kind. 
In view of the severely-depressed market in Duchesne 
County, Utah, it may be economically impractical to attempt to 
pursue a quiet title action to the six acres as against 
Didericksen and the bank to whom he has mortgaged the property. 
It may be determined that costs of suit for that effort may well 
exceed the value of the land, or at least make the effort 
financially impractical. Further, the futility of the lower 
court's order is demonstrated sincethe purported adjudication of 
the lower court that defendant does not own the six acres would 
not appear to be res judicata as to a subsequent quiet-title 
action by defendant against Didericksen and the bank to whom he 
sold the property, or any subsequent owner. As it was not 
necessary in this action for the court to determine whether 
defendant owned the six acres or not, such determine is 
immaterial, unessential and therefore not res judicata in a 
subsequent action. 46 Am Jr 2d, Judgments, Section 423, states: 
"For a judgment to operate as res judicata and be 
conclusive evidence of a fact sought to be established by 
it, it must appear that the fact was a material or essential 
one, and that the judgment could not have been rendered 
without deciding the matter. In this respect, the general 
rule is that the judgment in the former action operates as 
an estoppel only as to matters which were necessarily 
involved and determined in the former action, and is not 
conclusive as to matters which were immaterial or 
unessential to the determination of the prior action, or 
which were not issuable therein, or which were not germane 
to, implied in, or essentially connected with, the actual 
issues in the case, or which were not necessary to uphold 
the judgment. This rule has been applied, although such 
matters were presented in the earlier action and actually 
determined therein, and although they may affect the 
ultimate rights of the parties." 
Furthermore, any determination in this action would not 
be res judicata because Didericksen did not take title from 
plaintiffs and is therefore not in privity with them. See 46 Am 
Jur 2d, Judgments, Section 533. Whatever title Didericksen may 
have, if any, does not come from these plaintiffs, and he is in no 
sense a successor to them. 
POINT II. EARNEST MONEY AND REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WERE 
NOT EXECUTED CONCURRENTLY, AND RULES APPLICABLE TO DOCUMENTS 
EXECUTED CONCURRENTLY ARE NOT APPLICABLE. 
In support of plaintiffs1 claim that defendant is not 
entitled to the six acres, they argue that seven documents were 
concurrently executed at the closing. (See page 23 of respondents1 
Brief.) Apparently plaintiffs are attempting by that reasoning to 
explain away paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Contract of December 
19, 1980f which requires an additional payment of $3f000 per acre 
to be made before conveyance of the six acres to Elder. One 
however canvasses the seven documents in vain for any provision in 
any of them which relieves buyer of the requirement of paying an 
extra amount of $3f000 per acre before the property is conveyed. 
Both the Warranty Deed (see page 3 of Addendum "C" of plaintiffs1 
Brief) and the Quit-claim Deed (Exhibit 10) cover the total 76 
acres. The only document that could lend any support to 
plaintiffs' argument is the Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit 4), 
but, by its own terms, it was abrogated by the execution of the 
Real Estate Contract. See line 43 of the said Earnest Money 
Agreement, which states: " . . . execution of the final contract 
shall abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase." 
By its nature the Earnest Money was intended to be in existence 
prior to the Uniform Real Estate Contract. That is its logical 
position where a number of documents are executed. Defendant 
states at page 20 of her Brief: 
" . • . in the absence of anything to indicate a 
contrary intention, instruments executed at the same 
time, by the same contracting parties for the same 
purpose . . . will be considered and construed together 
since they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract or 
instrument." 
The problem with that, however, is that a contrary 
intention is indicated. The Earnest Money provides that it is to 
be abrogated upon signing of the final contract, and that 
expressly sets forth the intent of the parties, and where the 
language is clear, it is not necessary nor permissible to seek the 
intent of the parties elsewhere. Furthermore, as the Earnest 
Money is by its nature a preliminary agreement, it will in law be 
deemed to have been executed prior to (not concurrently with) the 
Real Estate Contract and hence to be abrogated by the signing of 
that final contract. It may have served to justify the payment of 
a commission, but it had no other effect. Plaintiffs' assertion 
at page 10 of their Brief, "It was the intent of Malnar and Elder 
that Elder receive title to the six (6) acre parcel at closing on 
December 19, 1980," flies directly in the face of the actual 
documents themselves. Plaintiffs1 assertion therefore (at page 24 
of their Brief) that "It cannot be disputed" that the seven 
documents were intended to be one is erroneous for the foregoing 
reason, and because (1) of Mrs. Malnar's testimony referred to in 
her Brief that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
signed on December 19, 1980, was placed in front of her as part of 
the closing documents without her understanding what it purported, 
and (2) her further statement that she understood that the six-
acre deed was being placed in escrow, to be released upon payment 
of additional consideration. These facts leave all kinds of room 
to "dispute" plaintiffs1 "seven documents" theory, and effectively 
do so. 
Defendant and Ferron Elder first entered into a written 
agreement with each other on July 23, 1980. At that time an 
Option Agreement was executed by defendant (Exhibit 46) and an 
Earnest Money and Offer to Purchase (Exhibit 3) was also executed 
by the parties. The Earnest Money for was for the sale of the six-
acre tract which we are discussing, and the Option Agreement 
covered the other 70 acres. The Earnest Money (Exhibit 3) 
provided that it was conditioned upon the execution of the Option 
Agreement. The Earnest Money provided for release of one-acre 
parcels from the six-acre tract upon payment of $2,200 per acre 
for each acre released. The Option Agreement provided for the 
release of ten-acre parcels from the 70-acre tract upon payment of 
$2,200 per acre in addition to the annual payment. The Earnest 
Money Agreement provided for a commission of $20 to Labrum Real 
Estate, and the Option Agreement provided for a real estate 
commission of $2,200. The total purchase price was therefore 
$105,000 for the 70 acres and $9,000 for the six acres, for a 
total of $114,000, with a combined down payment of $23,400 ($5,000 
plus $16,000 plus $2,400). 
The validity of the Option is questionable. No amount 
of money was paid for the Option, although $5,000 was apparently 
to be paid several months later on September 1, 1980. As there 
was no obligation on the part of Elder to pay the $5f000f the 
Option would presumably be unenforceable. If the Option was 
unenforceable, then the Earnest Money, being conditioned upon 
execution of the Option, might likewise be deemed to be a nullity. 
In any event, the $5,000 was never paid on September 1, 
1980, and was apparently tendered to Mrs. Malner on November 12, 
1980. She returned the same as being out of time (see Exhibit 
47). Between November 22 and the closing on December 19, the 
parties negotiated a new agreement. Duchesne County was seeing 
boom times with prices rising, and a new sales price of $152,000 
was negotiated. Plaintiffs concede this and at page 29 of their 
Brief state that their appraiser, Jud Harward: 
"testified that the subject property was increasing in 
value. In July 1980 it was worth $1,500 per acre. (Tr. 
143) On December 18 and 19, 1980 it was worth $2,000 per 
acre. On December 30, 1980 it was worth $3,500 per acre." 
The new contract (Ex. 5) incorporated the same release of acreage 
concept and in fact was initially typed with the $2,200 figure, 
which was crossed out and the figure $3,000 inserted and initialed 
by the parties, showing their specific agreement on that point. 
(See Ex. 5, paragraph 17.) It is evident that the Earnest Money 
Agreement of December 19, 1980, did not reflect the agreement of 
the parties with regard to release of acreage. The fact that the 
final documents are at variance with the Earnest Money appears to 
be conclusive on that point. The only purpose that the Earnest 
Money Receipt served, given the fact that it contained the 
abrogation language referred to above,- was to provide for a $2f200 
commission, because coming into the closing no commission was 
payable since the Option had not been taken up and the first 
Earnest Money was presumably invalid, but in any event only 
provided for a $20 commission. 
Furthermore, the Earnest Money dated December 18, 1980, 
which was apparently signed on December 19, 1980, (Ex. 4) varies 
in a number of other respects from the actual contract which was 
signed. The Real Estate Contract provided for the recording of a 
notice of interest and contains other provisions not referred to 
in the Earnest Money. For example, in paragraph 14 it contains a 
covenant limiting alienation of the contract not referred to in 
the Earnest Money. It has a provision (paragraph 3) relating to 
early payments which is not referred to in the Earnest Money, and 
provisions (paragraph 4) relating to escrow which are not referred 
to in the Earnest Money. Also, as noted, the Quit-claim Deed 
which was placed in escrow (Ex. 10) referred to the entire 76 
acres and, had the parties intended the release of six acres at 
closing, the Quit-claim would only have been drawn for 70 acres. 
Likewise the Warranty Deed placed in escrow to convey the property 
upon payment in full of the contract (page 3 of Addendum "C" to 
plaintiffs1 Brief) referred to 76 acres. A Warranty Deed covering 
the entire 76 acres would not be necessary in the event the 
parties had agreed at closing to convey six acres. 
And of course, as noted earlier, the Stipulation entered 
into March 7, 1985, (Exhibit 26) declares the full 76 acres to be 
the property of Mrs, Malnar. Plaintiffs1 assertion at page 43 of 
their Brief is deceptive in that it quotes one paragraph from the 
said Stipulation and from that argues that "Elder was entitled to 
the eminent domain award" and that the language in paragraph 3 of 
the Stipulation was "clearly consistent with that stipulation." 
This selective vision, which ignores the first two paragraphs of 
the same Stipulation, is remarkable to say the least. Paragraph 1 
of the Stipulation provides: "Marvel Malnar is the record owner 
of that certain real property involved in the above-entitled 
action to which the aforementioned defendants are parties, the 
real property being more particularly described as: . . . " and 
there then follows the legal description of the entire 76-acre 
tract. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the Stipulation states: "The 
parties agree that the defendant, Marvel Malnar, is exclusively 
entitled to any damages awarded in connection with the above-
entitled action for the taking, severance and other consequential 
damages as they relate to the portion of the above-described 
property that plaintiff [Deseret Generation & Transmission 
Cooperative] has taken and now occupies, which portion is a small 
part of the larger parcel described above." (Emphasis added.) 
It is thus seen from explicit and unambiguous language 
that plaintiffs1 predecessors both acknowledged that the defendant 
was then the owner of the whole 76-acre parcel and entitled to all 
of the eminent domain proceeds, which is clearly inconsistent with 
any argument by plaintiffs that somehow Elder and his associates 
and their successors (the plaintiffs herein) should get any 
entitlement to any eminent domain proceeds. To hold otherwise is 
to rewrite the Stipulation. 
Furthermore, at page 24 of their Brief plaintiffs 
assert that paragraph 17 in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
refers to property other than the six-acre tract, but that is not 
what it says. That simply was not the agreement of the parties. 
POINT III. THE UTAH CASE OF BUTLER V. WILKINSON IS NOT 
MISREPRESENTED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
The plaintiffs assert at page 31 of their Brief that 
defendant "misrepresents the holding in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 
P2d 1244 (Utah 1987)" and conclude by asserting that that case is 
"factually and legally inapposite." Defendant does not believe 
that anything was misrepresented in connection with that case. 
Appellant's Brief at pages 20 and 21 accurately quoted from the 
decision. The plaintiffs devote twelve lines to the case and 
nowhere attempt to analyze or explain the portions quoted from the 
case by the defendant, nor to indicate wherein there was any 
misrepresentation. The case is directly against the plaintiffs 
and precludes any recovery by them. It is perhaps understandable 
that they chose not to discuss it at any length. 
In the Butler case the court had to determine what 
equity Themy had in the property and whether or not that equity 
was still available or whether it terminated with Themy's interest 
under the contract. The court found that Themy's interest had not 
been terminated and that $186f300 was available for creditors. 
The court went on, however, to find at page 1259 that Christensen 
was entitled to the benefit of the doctrine that "The lien of a 
judgment against a person for whose benefit another holds the 
legal title to lands is not effective as against a subsequent bona 
fide purchaser from the trustee without notice of the trust . . ." 
(The foregoing is quoted in the Butler decision from 46 Am Jur 2d, 
Judgments, Section 297, at page 501 [1969].) The court further 
found that Christensen was a bona fide purchaser and that he had 
made adequate investigation as to the status of the title and was 
entitled to rely upon representations that Themy no longer had an 
interest in the property. 
Each of the mattery decided was necessary to the court's 
decision. It is clear that the "judicial mind" was carefully 
applied to each of the foregoing points and that each was a 
building block used by the court in reaching its ultimate 
decision. Had any increase in value (Themy's equity) been 
available to Themy, notwithstanding forfeiture, and thus available 
to his creditors, it would not have been necessary for the court 
to determine the issue of whether there was a valid forfeiture. 
Certainly the points cited by respondents in their Brief were 
points of law deliberately passed upon by the court in its 
carefully-reasoned decision. Even where a decision of a court 
could be supported on one of several reasons given by that court 
for its decision, all reasons given are nevertheless part of the 
holding of the case. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 US 
535, 93 L ed 1524, 69 S Ct 1235 (1949). Certainly the "radiating 
potencies" of the Butler decision "tilt the balanced mind toward 
submission and agreement." Hawkes v. Hammill, 288 US 52, 77 L ed 
610, 53 S Ct 240 (1933). 
Furthermore, the decision in Butler that any increase in 
the value is only available to a purchaser until he is forfeited 
accords with common sense and is self-evident. It is in accord 
with the other Utah cases cited in appellant's Brief, to-wit, 
Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P2d 1082 (Utah 1983), Warner v. Rassmusen, 
704 P2d 562 (Utah 1985) and Kay v. Wood, 549 P2d 709 (Utah 1976). 
Plaintiffs do not discuss the "increase in value aspect" of any of 
these cases. And the Butler decision seems to be fully in accord 
with decisions from other states. See, for example, the case of 
Friedman vs. Rector, Etc., of St. Mathias Parish, 230 P2d 629 
(California 1951), in which the seller sold two lots for $18,000. 
A $2,000 down payment was made by the buyer and he then repudiated 
the contract. He later changed his mind and sought specific 
performance or, that failing, for restitution of the down payment. 
The court denied specific performance, and with respect to 
restitution of the down payment the court said that $900 of the 
down payment went to the real estate commission so that the 
maximum that he could recover was $1,100. The court said that 
there were other issues relating to other expenses which the 
seller might be justified in offsetting against that sum and 
therefore remanded the case for further trial on that limited 
issue. The seller had resold the lots for $20,000, and the point, 
therefore, is that under the theory urged by the plaintiffs in 
this action, restitution to the buyer would be for the difference 
between the balance owing at the time of default, which was 
$16,000, and the value of the property returned to the seller. As 
the seller sold the property almost immediately after forfeiture 
for $20,000, its value was obviously $20,000. Therefore, under 
plaintiffs1 theory the seller owed the difference of $4,000 to the 
buyer. He, of course, was not awarded that as the Supreme Court 
of California said that the maximum liability of seller would be 
the $1,100, in other words, the part of the payment which exceeded 
seller's damages, but not including any increase in value of the 
property. Defendant has been unable to find any case anywhere 
awarding a defaulting seller any increase in the value of the 
property, nor have plaintiffs cited any, all of which demonstrates 
that Butler was fairly characterized by defendant and that it 
states the general rule nationwide. 
At page 32 of their Brief plaintiffs deny that the trial 
court credited them with the increased value of the land, but that 
assertion is totally inaccurate. Their claimed restitution figure 
of $71,183.14 can only be arrived at by charging defendant with 
the increased value as though it were a payment to her. On page 
43 all pretense is dropped and plaintiffs show as an "alternative" 
computation showing the receipt by defendant of her own land as an 
overpayment on the contract. There is no way to arrive at any 
restitution figure to plaintiffs without charging defendant for 
the increase in the value of the land she gets back and then 
requiring her to reimburse that sum to plaintiffs as an 
overpayment. 
POINT IV. DEFAULTING BUYER CANNOT, BY ENCUMBERING 
TITLE, IMPOSE ON SELLER DECLINE IN MARKET VALUE INCURRED DURING 
PERIOD TITLE IS ENCUMBERED. 
Plaintiffs argue at page 18 that defendant's actual 
damages were "Properly Calculated as of February 3, 1984, The Date 
She Terminated The contract." Although perhaps damages are 
usually determined with reference to the time of breach, the facts 
of this case take this case outside of the usual situation, and as 
of February 3, 1984, under any interpretation of this case, 
defendant did not have all of the property back in a condition in 
which she could sell it, and she is not required to attempt to 
sell a property which by reason of title defects is not 
marketable. No person is required to do a useless act. The six 
acres were hopelessly encumbered as of February 3, 1984. Also, a 
Notice of Interest (Ex. 24) appeared of record against the entire 
76 acres within 11 days after February 3, 1984, and plaintiff's 
predessors were still asserting a right to the 76 acres and to the 
eminent domain proceeds. The matter of the entitlement to eminent 
domain proceeds and to the ownership of the 76 acres 
(nothwithstanding recording of the Quit-claim Deed) was not 
resolved until the Stipulation was signed March 7, 1985, (Ex. 26) 
in which the plaintiffs1 predecessors conceded that defendant 
owned all of the 76 acres and that the eminent domain proceeds 
were to be hers. That would be the earliest time at which the 
matter of the title was in any manner resolved, and defendant 
cannot equitably be considered to have taken the property back any 
earlier than that date. Testimony as to value at that date 
clearly was that the market was in the severe decline,and the 
entire property was not worth more than $98,000. 
It seems grossly unjust to assert that defendant is 
chargeable with the value of property as of February 3, 1984, when 
she was, by actions of the plaintiffs, precluded from saving 
herself from loss by selling at whatever the then-market was. 
Plaintiffs contend that the market was very high at that time, and 
defendant denies that it was anywhere near as high as plaintiffs 
claim, but it was clear by all testimony that it severely declined 
after February 3, 1984, and it is not equitable to impose on 
defendant the consequences of that decline when breach of contract 
by plaintiffs1 predecessors and their subsequent conduct prevented 
defendant from trying to salvage what she could after such breach. 
Defendant respectfully submits that plaintiffs should bear the 
loss due to the delay in returning clear title to the property to 
defendant by determining value at the later date, or at least by 
charging plaintiffs with interest representing the value of the 
loss of use of the land during the delay period. 
At page 35 plaintiffs assert that at trial they were 
willing to release the Notice of Interest "as successors in 
interest of the majority of partners in Eastern Utah Resources." 
The fact of the matter is that plaintiffs only purchased this 
lawsuit for restitution. All they purchased was this "legal 
action." (See Ex. 19.) They did not buy the land, nor any 
interest therein. They did not buy the partnership, nor any 
interest therein. There is no document that they could sign that 
would clear title to the 76 acres, or any part of it. 
POINT V. EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDS ARE NOT A PAYMENT ON 
THE CONTRACT, BUT RATHER STAND IN PLACE OF THE LAND TAKEN. 
At pages 40 and 41 of plaintiffs1 Brief, they argue that 
the contract purchaser is entitled to the eminent domain proceeds. 
Defendant normally would not quarrel with that position and so 
stated in her Brief on page 38. By virtue of the Stipulation of 
March 7, 1985 (Exhibit 26), however, it was settled that the 
proceeds belonged to defendant, and they were obviously intended 
to compensate defendant for the damage to the property which she 
took back under the contract. It is certainly not fair for 
plaintiffs to have credit for the eminent domain proceeds as a 
payment on the contract, but to impose upon defendant the 
uncompensated burden of the damaged property. If defendant has to 
take back the property, subject to the impediment imposed upon it 
by Deseret Transmission, she is entitled to compensation for that 
damage to the property and the plaintiffs do not get to "double-
dip" by claiming credit therefor as a payment somehow on the 
contract. At page 42 plaintiffs state, "However, the $35,075 
award Malnar eventually received had the effect of reducing the 
February 3, 1984, contract balance of $101,919.35 to $66,844.35." 
In other words, plaintiffs clearly are claiming that the eminent 
domain proceeds constitute a payment on the contract, 
notwithstanding they were not received until 1985 and 1986. If 
indeed they are somehow to constitute a payment on the contract, 
then it can only be because the contract is in existance and was 
never forfeited, and we are in that event faced with an entirely 
different legal situation. We would be left with the result that 
the contract is still in full force and effect with a balance 
owing of $66,844.35 plus interest and, no payment having been made 
since 1986, the contract would be in default once again and the 
defendant would be forced to make an election as to how she would 
proceed. 
A number of times in their Brief (see, for example, 
page 32 and page 40) respondents assert that, because of the 
condemnation action, they would have had the right to rescind the 
Real Estate Contract. Whether that is so or not is an issue that 
we need not reach because the buyer never so elected and was not 
in a position to return all of defendant's property to her, which 
return would have been a precondition to any rescission in any 
event. 
POINT VI. TO ALLOW CREDIT TO DEFAULTING BUYER FOR 
INCREASE IN VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY IS NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO 
PRECEDENT, BUT WOULD VIRTUALLY DESTROY THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT AS 
A VIABLE MEANS OF ALIENATING PROPERTY. 
It seems clear that if the court were to uphold the 
plaintiffs' theory that the seller must account to the buyer for 
any increase in value, it would be contrary to all precedent, 
contrary to the reasonable expectations (under existing precedent) 
of a seller, and furthermore it will effectively destroy the sale 
of real property by contract. 
The principal reason that landowners sell by contract is 
because of the remedy afforded them for forfeiture. Any other 
remedy is perhaps better achieved through a mortgage or trust 
deed. Being able to sell on a contract, however, enables many 
buyers to purchase properties which they otherwise would not be 
able to buy through conventional financing. They are able to buy 
properties with small down payments, and sellers are willing to 
enter into agreements of that kind because they have the rather 
speedy remedy of forfeiture in the event of default. No seller is 
going to utilize the forfeiture provision of the real estate 
contract if he has to pay buyer any increase in the value of 
property because no seller in his right mind is going to want to 
take the risk that the defaulting buyer may be able to find a more 
persuasive real estate appraiser who will testify to increases in 
value which may be accepted by the fact finder. Allowing a 
defaulting buyer to charge the seller with any "increase in sales 
price" will certainly be the death knell for sales by contract. A 
defaulting buyer should not be so rewarded, and he does not need 
such a provision because if there is in fact an "increase" in 
value, the buyer, if he cannot make the payments on the property, 
can sell the property for that "increase" and pay off the seller 
and keep the profit. What prudent buyer, if in fact he is holding 
a contract to purchase which has "increased" in value, would let 
it be lost through forfeiture in the first place, since he can 
protect himself by selling it? If anyone needs protection, it is 
a defaulting buyer holding a property which has decreased in value 
as his situation may be desperate. A buyer holding a property 
which has increased in value does not need any special protection, 
nor is he entitled to it, and he should not be rewarded for his 
own default, and certainly not for his own failure to promptly 
market a property which has substantially increased in value when 
he cannot make the payments. 
POINT VII. PLAINTIFFS ARE IN NO EVENT ENTITLED TO 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Defendant/appellant/cross-respondent herewith responds 
to the Cross-Appeal and contends that plaintiffs are entitled to 
no judgment whatever as heretofore discussed, and if defendant is 
correct in that position, then of course no interest would be 
owing. Even if plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment of some 
kind, they are not entitled to prejudgment interest. 
Defendant Malnar cites Bjork v. April Industries, Inc.f 
560 P2d 315 (Utah 1977)f in support of her contention that 
prejudgment interest should not in any event be allowed to 
plaintiffs in this action. In Bjork the Supreme Court of Utah set 
forth at page 317 a summary of the law of prejudgment interest in 
Utah and in footnote 4 of said summary the court refers to the 
following three Utah cases: Jack B. Parson Construction Company 
v. State of Utah, 552 P2d 107 (Utah 1976), Uinta Pipeline v. White 
Superior Company, 546 P2d 885 (Utah 1976), and Fell v. Union 
Pacific, 32 Ut 101, 88 P 1003 (1907). The said statement of the 
court in Bjork found at page 317 is an attempt to summarize the 
earlier decisions of the court. In Bjork the Court set forth the 
law as follows: 
"As to the allowance of interest before judgment, 
this Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is 
clear, viz: where the damage is complete and the amount 
of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that 
loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time and not from the date 
of the judgment. On the other hand, where damages are 
incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy, such as in case of personal injury, wrongful 
death, defamation of character, false imprisonment, 
etc., the amount of the damage must be ascertained and 
assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and in 
such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Judge Bunnell's theory of damages set forth in paragraph 
6 of the Memorandum Decision and incorporated in substance as 
paragraph 25 of the Findings of Fact includes the amount received 
by -defendant from condemnation in his computation as though the 
same were a payment on the balance owing on the contract. 
Likewise, in the theory of the plaintiffs, which the Court adopted 
as paragraph 24 of the Findings of Fact, the same eminent domain 
proceeds are credited as though a payment by the plaintiffs to the 
defendant. 
The eminent domain proceeds were not received by 
defendant until a considerable period of time after the Quit-claim 
Deed was delivered to defendant from escrow and recorded on 
February 3, 1984. Malnar received from the condemnation $9,075 in 
1985, and the balance of $32,000 was received in 1986. 
There is therefore no way that the defendant could be 
charged interest on the receipt of those sums from February 3, 
1984. The very request for interest points out the error in the 
Court's decision in the first place. It is impossible to claim, 
as required by Bjork, that damages were complete as of February 3, 
1984, when an important element of those damages (according to 
defendants), to-wit, $35,075, was not received until over a year 
later, and most of it two years later. The condemnation action 
was not disposed of until 1986, at which time the Court in that 
condemnation action made its decision. So far as was known in 
1984 the eminent domain proceeds could have been double that 
ultimately awarded or one-half that ultimately awarded. The point 
is that they were not fixed until the Court made its final ruling 
in the condemnation action in 1986. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to interest from the date of 
the last payment to defendant of eminent domain proceeds in 1986. 
There is no theory upon which interest could be awarded from that 
interim point. If interest is owing, it is owing from February 3f 
1984, or not at all. 
For the reasons stated, plaintiffs are not entitled to 
any judgment against defendant, and in any event damages were not 
complete as of February 3, 1984, even under the erroneous theory 
used to arrive at that Judgment, and therefore plaintiffs are not 
entitled to the claimed prejudgment interest in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully 
requests that the decision of the lower court be reversed and that 
judgment be entered in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
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